Michigan Law Review
Volume 83

Issue 4

1985

The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and
Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1101
(1985).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/46

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

February 1985]

Federal Courts and the Constitution

1101

THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION. By Raymond Wolters. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee

Press. 1984. Pp. 345. $24.95.
Professor Raymond Wolters' 1 The Burden of Brown explores several issues that have preoccupied legal commentators, educators, politicians, and parents of school children since the Supreme Court
decided Brown v. Board of Education. 2 The Burden of Brown questions the proper role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy
and, more pointedly, whether color-conscious remedies that focus on
racial balance as opposed to simply prohibiting de jure segregation,
such as forced busing, are a legitimate extension of Brown. Wolters'
answer is that Brown should be interpreted as prohibiting only official
racial discrimination, not as condemning color-neutral policies that
fail to achieve substantive racial integration (p. 288). 3 Thus, Wolters
views post-Brown judicial decisions, in which courts nullified timetested color-neutral policies of local school boards and school superintendents, as nothing more than judges dictating social policy.
To support his argument, Professor Wolters presents five case histories of school desegregation and integration: Washington, D.C.;
Prince Edward County, Virginia; Clarendon County, South Carolina;
New Castle County, New Jersey; and Topeka, Kansas. All of these
school districts were involved in what are commonly known as the
1. Wolters is Professor of History at the University of Delaware.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. "Desegregation" requires the removal of all racial barriers while "integration" involves an
affirmative duty to create racial balance.
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original School Desegregation Cases. 4 The choice oflocales is no accident, since The Burden of Brown was conceived as a response and sequel to Richard Kluger's Simple Justice. 5 In a bibliographical note
Wolters explains that "the story of desegregation was not as simple as
[depicted in] Kluger's morality tale" (p. 329). The Burden of Brown
was thus conceived as a "balanced account" of the events that followed Brown (p. 329).
Wolter's argument, repeated in each of the five case histories, is
that the judiciary's attempt to force integration on white middle-class
families was doomed to failure. Through numerous quotations from
the affected parties, Wolters argues that by mandating forced busing to
remedy desegregation and extending Brown to require complete racial
balance, judges advocated a remedy that was sociologically unsound
and would be firmly resisted by white parents. Wolters thus places the
blame for white flight to the suburbs, the deterioration of public education, and the eventual resegregation of public school systems on
post-Brown judicial decisions. Wolters' argument is not new, and the
case study approach focusing on the personalities and political forces
that affect a controversy has also been used before in this context. 6
Perhaps the only additional contribution of The Burden of Brown is
that it forcefully presents the white parents' perspective in the school
desegregation and integration controversy. But in so doing, The Burden of Brown forfeits any claim to being a "balanced" account (p.
329).
Throughout the book, Wolters explores white parents' and the
white community's various fears about racial integration in order to
explain why whites would resolutely resist the judiciary's attempts at
integration. But what Wolters portrays as the white community's
heartfelt fear of integration often appears to the reader to be nothing
more than sincere but prejudiced belief. For example, in describing the
problems that accompanied racial desegregation in Washington, D.C.,
Wolters lists among the several factors that created a rapidly deteriorating school environment, whites' concern over the high incidence of
venereal disease and pregnancies among the black students and attendant fear that desegregation "would have a tendency to bring white
girls down to [the] level [of blacks]" (p. 14). Similarly, in discussing
the Prince Edward desegregation conflict, Wolters quotes a school su4. Brown v. Board of Educ. was heard together with Briggs v. Elliott on appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina. Davis v. County School
Bd. was heard on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Gebhart v. Belton came to the Court on certiorari from the Supreme Court of Delaware. The public school system of Washington, D.C., was desegregated pursuant to Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), decided the same day as Brown.
5. R. KI.UGER, SIMPLE JusncE (1975).
6. See, e.g., D. KIRP, Jusr SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDU·
CATION (1982).
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perintendent as saying that "[s]exual promiscuity is what [whites] fear
most" (p. 84). And in the New Castle chapter, Wolters describes a
white father's concern over the possibility that his boy would "come
away from school with a colored bride" (p. 181).
Wolters so insistently presents the white parents' perspective in the
school integration controversy that his narrative account of the postBrown events often turns into a carefully documented catalogue of the
old and tired cliches about blacks believed by some white parents and
educators at the time the courts were mandating racial integration.
Herein lies the major flaw of The Burden ofBrown. Wolters' narrative
technique of quoting extremist views of race relations and his repeated
use of discredited views to support his argument has the net effect of
substantially defacing, rather than supporting, what might have been a
creditable thesis. For example, in describing the Charleston, South
Carolina, school desegregation litigation,7 Wolters outlines the segregationists' efforts to persuade the district court that there was a rational basis for segregation. The school board presented an expert
witness, a professor of anatomy, who testified that "[t]he average black
brain weighed about 9 percent less than that of the average white, the
cortex was about 14 percent thinner, and the prefontal area of the
white brain was larger." These "hereditary characteristics" created
differences in the races' aptitudes for education, "and their effects
could not be overcome by desegregation" (p. 147). Resuscitating this
type of argument does nothing to enhance Wolters' main thesis that
decisions regarding education should be made democratically at the
local level and not mandated by judges. Instead, the effect of Wolters'
insertion of so many racially offensive statements throughout the book
is that the reader loses receptivity to the white parents' position in this
controversy. Thus, the major problem with The Burden of Brown is
that Wolters' narrative style is not persuasive, but offensive.
Another reason that Wolters fails to be persuasive is not because,
as Wolters claims, the book challenges "the prevailing wisdom" (p. 8),
but rather because of the glaring absence of a balanced approach to
what are controversial and unsettled issues in law, sociology, and education. Wolters never concedes that there may be beneficial sociological achievements promoted by integration. Schools teach important
values not measured by achievement test scores. Young children will
eventually become adults; at some point, both black and white children should learn how to get along with one another. 8 Yet for
Wolters, any study that shows desegregation and integration may have
some beneficial effects should be carefully scrutinized for an ulterior
motive. Wolters notes that "[t]he Department of Education has spent
7. Brown v. School Dist. No. 20, 226 F. Supp. 819 (1963), affd., 328 F.2d 618 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964).
8. See w. RYAN, EQUALITY 159 (1981).
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millions of dollars for research on desegregation, but scholars are
clearly given to understand that 'desegregation is essential' and that
grants are intended only for studies that will [point to the benefits of
desegregation]" (p. 285). Thus, Wolters concludes, "[i]t is not surpris. ing . . . that much of the government-sponsored research indicates
that 'there are no losses for white children in the desegregation process
. . . [and] substantial gains for minority children' " (p. 285).
Wolters' conclusory comments on the Warren Court and the
Brown decision are symptomatic of his unusual brand of "balanced"
approach. In the breadth of nine sentences, Wolters disposes of a raging academic debate concerning the proper role of the Supreme Court
in a democratic society and the legal scope of the fourteenth amendment. According to Wolters, the Brown opinion is "shockingly bad"
as a "matter of law" because the Warren Court "ignored the established rule for constitutional construction" by disregarding the intent
of the framers and ratifiers of the equal protection clause (pp. 273-74).
Wolters unequivocally states that "the equal protection clause was not
originally understood to prohibit [de jure or de facto] segregation" (p.
274). This leads Wolters to conclude that in Brown the Warren Court
"usurped the power to amend the Constitution . . . and read their
idea of proper social policy into the Constitution" (p. 274). This unsupported attack on the Warren Court is not at all surprising, since
Wolters makes known his dislike for post-Brown courts throughout
the book. Judges involved in post-Brown decisions are alternatively
referred to as "arrogan[t]" (p. 63), "disingenuous" (p. 289), and more
generally as "the ermine of the bench" (p. 155).
The Burden of Brown, in sum, fails to accomplish what it sets out
to do: render a "balanced account" of the impact of Brown v. Board of
Education (p. 329). Instead, The Burden of Brown often becomes
nothing more than a tasteless and repetitive monograph on conservative segregationist ideology. As a result, this book fails to contribute
to the body of academic literature concerned with the sociological, educational, and legal effects of Brown.

